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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
ECHO NEY, TRUSTEE, 
WASATCH HOMES, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.-
G. T. HARRISON and 
ALDA J. HARRISON, 
Defendants and Respondents 
No. 8437 
Petition for Rehearing 
The respondents petition the court for a rehearing 
with regard to Point 2 of the appeal in the above matter, 
which was ruled on by this court on the 3rd day of 
July, 1956. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ~IISINTERPRETED THE 
FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT DENIES THE PETITION 
FOR REHEARING, THE COURT SHOULD 
A1IEND ITS REMITTITUR TO REQUIRE · 
TI-IE LO"\VER COURT TO ~fAKE A FINDING 
ON THE ISSUE OF THE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST. 
A R G U l\II EN T 
POINT I 
THE COURT ~IISI~TERPRETED THE 
FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
The court misinterpreted the facts in the instant 
ease, and in so doing sets forth a distinction between this 
ease and the case of Smith Realty Company Y. Dipietro, 
77 U. 176, 292 P. 915, which does not exist, the court, com-
menting on the decision in that ease, stating at page 3, 
of the majority opinion: 
''The broker neither pleaded nor proved any 
contract rxpn'R~ly employing him in writing or 
otlwrwisr, but relied ou the recital pertaining to 
the payment of a brokerage fee. The court re-
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garded the recital as merely incidental to the con-
tract and therefore ruled that it conferred no 
rights on the broker; and accordingly that it could 
not be construed as a memorandum in writing em-
ploying the broker to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds in the broker's behalf, with which we do 
not disagree.'' 
A thorough examination of Smith v. Dipietro indi-
cates that the court's interpretation of that case is sub-
stantially correct ; also, a review of the record in the 
case with which this petition is concerned indicates that 
the two cases with regard to the point of law herein in-
volved are almost identical. 
First, as the court points out in the portion of the 
opinion above set forth, ''The broker neither pleaded nor 
proved any contract expressly employing him in writing 
or otherwise, but relied on a recital pertaining to the pay-
ment of a brokerage fee." In the present case, the plain-
tiff relies solely on the earnest money receipt attached 
to the original complaint (R. 1), and as set forth in 
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of plaintiff's amended complaint 
(R. 1). 
The court, at page 3 of the majority decision, sets 
forth a portion of the agreement between the buyer and 
seller in the Dipietro case, which is also set forth at 209 
P. 916: 
''The respective parties hereto agree to pay 
the (realtor) the authorized broker, for effecting 
the sale and exchange of properties the commis-
sions as follo,vs: The seller agrees to pay a com-
mission in the sum of Five I-Iundred Dollars and 
the buyer agrees to pay a commission in the sum 
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of Three Hundred Thirty-three and 33/100 ... 
Dollars. Said commissions payable to the (real-
tor) at their (address given) .... " 
Exhibit ''A'' in the present case is also an agreement 
between the buyers and the sellers, and insofar as is 
applicable to a commission states: 
"The seller agrees in consideration of the ef-
forts of the agent in procuring a purchaser to pay 
said agent a commission equal to the minimum 
recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board. 
In the event sellers have entered into a listing con-
tract with any other agent and the said contract is 
presently effective, this paragraph would be of no 
force and effect,'' 
and in the blank at the bottom of Exhibit "A" has been 
written the words, "Total commission to be two and one-
half per cent." 
The writer contends that that language is merely 
incidental to the contract between the seller and buyer 
as in the Dipietro case, with which the majority opinion 
states this court does not disagree (Page 3 of majority 
opinion). 
Further, as above noted, the plaintiff and appellant 
in the instant case rely upon the earnest money receipt, 
Exhibit "A," in itself, not as a memorandum to take an 
oral coutract out of the statute of frauds. Xo·where in the 
pleadings is there an allegation of a contract, oral or oth-
erwi~P, between the seller and the broker, nor does the 
e\·idence show a parole agreement of which the earnest 
money receipt is a memorandum. 
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The plaintiff in her brief sets forth testimony from 
Record 22 as follows : 
"Q. Who did you ask if they would help 
you? 
''A. This Wasatch Homes ; I think they call 
it 'Wasatch.' 
"Q. That Mr. Dean Parry1 
"A. Yes." 
indicating that she asked Dean Parry to help her sell the 
Snow Apartments. Also at Record 22 is the following 
testimony: 
'' Q. You had listed that property known as 
the 'Snow Apartments' for sale, had you not? 
"A. No, I had asked different real estate 
men if they would help me sell it, but I never 
signed any-'' 
but nowhere in the testimony is there any indication of 
the elements of any oral contract which indicates the 
duties of the broker contracted for, or the consideration, 
if any, for the services to show a contract that the earnest 
money receipt would be a memorandum which complied 
with the statute of frauds, even if the plaintiff had pro-
ceeded on the theory of such a contract, which the plead-
ings show she did not. 
The writer has no quarrel with the decision in Ha-
waiian Equipment Company, Ltd., v. Eimco Corporation, 
115 U. 590, 207 P(2) 794, but contends that the case is 
distinguishable from the present case in that the Ha-
waiian Equipment case is negotiations by telegraph and 
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letter between two parties dealing directly with one 
another, though one did try to defend on the basis of 
being an agent for a third party, while the present case 
arises from a claimed agency contract which is nowhere 
set out. Nor does the writer disagree with the elements 
of the memoranda necessary to make an enforcible con-
tract as set out in the Restatement of Contracts, Section 
207. However, it would appear that item (c) thereof, as 
related in the majority opinion in this case, 
'' (c) the terms and conditions of all the 
promises constituting the contract and by whom 
the promisses are made,'' 
is not fulfilled either by the earnest money receipt nor by 
the evidence. It would appear from Exhibit "A," the 
earnest money receipt, that the duties of the real estate 
agent or broker, the amount of the original selling price, 
and the basis of time of sale are nowhere set out. 
The petitioner is also aware of the difference in the 
necessities of pleading at the time of Smith v. Dipietro 
and under the new rules as applied to the present case; 
however, on the basis that the plaintiff in the present case 
proceeded to try to recover not on an oral contract sup-
ported by a memorandum, but on an alleged written con-
tract, it would appear that this case should be governed 
by Taylor v. E. JYl. Royle Corp., ------------ U. ____________ , 264 
P(2) 27!l, where the court sets out: 
"F lldl'r the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
defendant must be extended every reasonable op-
portunit~· to pn'pare his case and to meet an 
adn'rsan·'s claims. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
;)4( {') ( 1). 
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''There are circumstances where court can 
allow recovery under quantum merit, even though 
plaintiff declared on an express contract, but only 
if defendant had fair opportunity to be apprised 
of and meet issue so presented. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 54 (c) ( 1) . " 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT DENIES THE PETITION 
FOR REHEARING, THE COURT SHOULD 
A11:END ITS REMITTITUR TO REQUIRE 
THE LOWER COURT TO MAKE A FINDING 
ON THE ISSUE OF THE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST. 
In addition to the above contention, it would also 
appear from an examination of the pleadings aP-d record 
that the lower court found it unnecessary to rule on the 
question of whether Echo Ney was the real party in in-
terest, the lower court having found no contract between 
the broker and the defendants. 
The real party in interest question is set up by the 
pleadings. The only evidence of an assignment from 
Wasatch Homes or Dean Parry was the testimony of the 
attorney for the plaintiff, Gordon T. Hyde, who had also 
been an officer of Wasatch Homes. Mr. Hyde had himself 
sworn and testified with respect to the assignment: 
"In the early spring of 1953, Wasatch Homes, 
Incorporated, incurred some obligations which 
they were unable to pay to several people, one of 
which is the plaintiff in this action, Echo N ey, 
and a meeting was held of all the stockholders of 
the corporation and of the creditors, at which time 
it was decided that the assets of the company 
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would be liquidated that I would be authorized to 
liquidate the assets and pay them over to these 
creditors in satisfaction of the obligations which 
the corporation had. 
''Pursuant to that, Mrs. N ey and the group of 
creditors accepted the proposition, and we pro-
ceeded to liquidate these assets and divide the 
proceeds. 
''This account sued upon is one of the assets 
which were assigned to these creditors, and Mrs. 
N ey is presently, as trustee for the group, the 
assignee and owner of this claim formerly belong-
ing to Wasatch Homes, Incorporated," (R. 61). 
and then upon cross-examination testified that there was 
no written assignment from either the company or the 
creditors to Echo Ney, nothing more than a resolution 
which was not reduced to writing at any time. See (Tr. 
48, line 12 to 18 Tr. 50, line 17-23) Record 65, 67. 
Petitioner contends that in view of the lower court's 
failure to rule on the real party in interest question, and 
the lack of evidence to show any valid assignment from 
Wasatch Homes to the plaintiff in this case, that should 
the court deny the rehearing on the basis set forth in ''A'' 
of this petition, that the court amend its remittitur re-
quiring the low~r court to make a findings with respect to 
Echo N ey 's right to recover on any obligation due to 
Wasatch Homes as well as to the claimed setoffs in the 
remittitur on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUl\LXER J. H~\_TCH 
Attorneys for Defeudants 
a11d Respondents 
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